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Those who most ignore, least escape.
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Abstract
Are minds subject to laws of physics? Are the laws of physics computable? Are conscious thought
processes computable? Currently there is little agreement as to what are the right answers to these
questions. Penrose ([41], p. 644) goes one step further and asserts that: a radical new theory is indeed
needed, and I am suggesting, moreover, that this theory, when it is found, will be of an essentially non-
computational character. The aim of this paper is three fold: 1) to examine the incompatibility between
the hypothesis of strong determinism and computability, 2) to give new examples of uncomputable
physical laws, and 3) to discuss the relevance of Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem in refuting the claim
that an algorithmic theory—like strong AI—can provide an adequate theory of mind. Finally, we question
the adequacy of the theory of computation to discuss physical laws and thought processes.
1 Introduction
Penrose [40] (see also [41]) has discussed a new point of view concerning the nature of physics that might
underline conscious thought processes. He has argued that it might be the case that some physical laws are
not computable, i.e. they cannot be properly simulated by computer; such laws can most probably arise
on the “no-man’s-land” between classical and quantum physics. Furthermore, conscious thinking is a non-
algorithmic activity. He is opposing both strong AI (according to which the brain’s action, and, consequently,
conscious perceptions and intelligence, are manifestations of computer computations, Minsky [35, 36]), and
Searle’s [47] contrary viewpoint (although computation does not in itself evoke consciousness, a computer
might nevertheless simulate the action of a brain mainly due to the fact that the human brain is a physical
system behaving according to (computable) mathematical “laws”).
The aim of this paper is to examine the incompatibility between the hypothesis of strong determinism and
computability, to give new examples of uncomputable physical laws, and to discuss the relevance of Go¨del’s
Incompleteness Theorem in refuting the claim that an algorithmic theory—like strong AI—can provide an
adequate theory of mind. Our starting point is the following paragraph from Penrose [40] p.560:
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It seems to me that if one has strong determinism, but without many worlds, then the mathemati-
cal scheme which governs the structure of the universe would probably have to be non-algorithmic.
For otherwise one could in principle calculate what one was going to do next, and then one could
‘decide’ to do something different, which would be an effective contradiction between ‘free will’
and the strong determinism of the theory. By introducing non-computability into the theory one
can evade this contradiction—though I have to confess that I feel somewhat uneasy about this
type of resolution, and I anticipate something more subtle for the actual (non-algorithmic!) rules
that govern the way that the world works!
2 From Boscovich to Go¨del
Perfect determinism was considered earlier by Boscovich [4], Leibniz and Laplace (see Barrow [2]). The main
argument is similar to the one used by Penrose: if all our laws, say, of motion, were in the form of equations
which determine the future uniquely and completely from the present, then a “superbeing” having a perfect
knowledge of the starting state would be able to predict the entire future. The puzzling consequence appears
as soon as one tries to carry out this prediction!
Go¨del was interested in this problem as well. According to notes taken by Rucker ([46], p.181) Go¨del’s
point of view is the following:
It should be possible to form a complete theory of human behaviour, i.e. to predict from the
hereditary and environmental givens what a person will do. However, if a mischievous person
learns of this theory, he can act in a way so as to negate it. Hence I conclude that such a theory
exists, but that no mischievous person will learn it. In the same way, time-travel is possible, but
no person will ever manage to kill his past self.
And he continues:
There is no contradiction between free will and knowing in advance precisely what one will do. If
one knows oneself completely then this is the situation. One does not deliberately do the opposite
of what one wants.
3 Strong Determinism
According to Penrose ([40], p. 558-559) strong determinism
is not just a matter of the future being determined by the past; the entire history of the universe
is fixed, according to some precise mathematical scheme, for all time.
Thus strong determinism is a variant of Laplace’s scenario,1 according to which the stage is set at the
beginning and everything follows “mechanistically” without the intervention of God, without the occurrence
of “miracles” (cf. Frank [24]).
Strong determinism does not imply a computable Universe, as it says nothing about the computability
of initial conditions or of physical laws.2
Let us discuss this in the context of the computer science. Any program p requiring some particular
input s can be rewritten into a new program p′ requiring no (the empty list ∅) input. This can for instance
been realized by coding the input s of p as constants of p′. Likewise, any part of p′ can be externalized
as a subprogram s, whose code can then be identified with an input for the new program p. In this sense,
the terms effective computation and initial value are interchangeable and the naming merely a matter of
convention. Therefore, if strong determinism leaves unspecified the computability of initial values serving
1“A thing cannot occur without a cause which produces it”.
2Assuming the Church-Turing Thesis, this is equivalent to saying that the laws of nature correspond to recursive functions.
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as input for recursive natural laws, it may as well leave unspecified the recursion theoretic status of natural
laws.
All this sounds rather abstract and mathematical, but the emergence of chaotic physical motion has
confronted the physics community with the theoretical question of whether or not to accept the classical (i.e.,
non-constructivist) continuum. As envisioned by Shaw [48] and Ford [23], along with many others, “classical
chaos” emerges by the effectively computable “visualization” of the incompressible algorithmic information
of the initial values. Thereby, the classical continuum serves as an “urn” containing (almost, i.e., with
probability one) only (uncomputable) Martin-Lo¨f/Chaitin/Solovay random elements. With probability one,
the physical system “chooses” one random element of the continuum “urn” as its initial value. In this sense,
chaotic dynamics expresses almost a tautology: put Martin-Lo¨f/Chaitin/Solovay randomness in, get chaotic
motion out. The non-tautologic feature is the “choice” of one element of the classical (i.e., non-constructivist)
continuum. In order to be able to choose from non-denumerable many uncomputable objects, the axiom of
choice has to be assumed. But then, one is confronted with “paradoxical” constructions utilizing this axiom
(cf. Wagon [56, 49]). In particular, one could transform every given physical object into any other physical
object (or class of objects) in three processing steps:
• decompose the original object into a finite number of pieces;
• apply isometric transformations such as rotations and translations to the pieces; and finally,
• rearrange them into the final form.
This might be the ultimate production belt: one can obtain an arbitrary number of identical copies from a
single prototype! We mention this utopy here not because of immediate technological applicability but to
point out the type of shock to which the physics community is going to be exposed if it pretends to keep
the “skeleton in the closet of continuum physics”. Indeed, all the following examples of strong determinism
clashing with uncomputability and randomness originate in the assumption of the appropriateness of the
classical continuum for physical modelling.
Quantum theory does not offer any real advancement over classical physics in this respect. It is a “half-
way” theory, in between the continuum and the discrete. As Einstein put it [20],
There are good reasons to assume that nature cannot be represented by a continuous field. From
quantum theory it could be inferred with certainty that a finite system with finite energy can be
completely described by a finite number of (quantum) numbers. This seems not in accordance
with continuum theory and has to stipulate trials to describe reality by purely algebraic means.
Nobody has any idea of how one can find the basis of such a theory.
Continuous hidden variable models of quantum mechanics such as Bohm’s model [3] operate with
pseudo-classical particles. The real-valued initial position of a Bohmean particle, for instance, is Martin-
Lo¨f/Chaitin/Solovay random with probability one. The particles move through computable quantum po-
tentials. As in chaos theory, the random occurrence of single particle detections originates again in the
assumption of the classical continuum. From this point of view, the Bohmean model of quantum mechanics
is not a “mechanistic” theory, although its evolution laws might be recursive.
Everett’s many-world interpretation of quantum mechanics [21] is not much of an advance either. It saves
the strong determinism by abandoning the wave function collapse at the price of a Universe branching off into
(sometimes uncountable) many Universes at any measurement or beam splitter equivalent. Currently, there
is very little knowledge concerning the computational status of the wave function3 or continuous observables.
Implicitly, the underlying sets are the classical (i.e., non-constructive) continua.
3See Pour-El and Richards [43], and the objections in Penrose [40], and Bridges [6].
3
4 Is Description Possible?
Can a system contain a description of itself? Of course, no finite system can contain itself as a proper part.
What we mean by “description” here is an algorithmic representation of the system. Such an algorithmic
representation could be interpretable as a “natural law” since it should allow the effective simulation of the
system from within the system.
Von Neumann [55] was concerned with the question of self-description in the context of the self-
reproduction of (universal) automata. His Cellular Automaton model was inspired by organic life-forms,
and the description “blueprint” for self-reproduction was inspired by the DNA. Today, automaton self-
reproduction is just one application of Kleene’s fixed-point theorem [45, 39].
Von Neumann realized that there must be a difference between an “active” and a “passive” mode of self-
description. The “passive” description is given to the system by some God-like external agent or oracle. It is
then possible for a finite system to contain such a “passive” representation of itself within itself as a proper
part. Based on this description, the system is capable of simulating itself.4 Such a self-description in general
cannot be obtained “actively” by self-inspection. The reason for this is computational complementarity
[37, 49] and the recursive unsolvability of the rule inference problem [30, 49].
5 Is Prediction Possible?
Is there any incompatibility between the strong determinism and computability, as Penrose suggests? Is it
indeed impossible for a person to “learn his own theory” (Go¨del)?
Let us assume that we have both strong determinism and computable physical laws. For the remainder
of this paper we fix a finite alphabet A and denote by A∗ the set of all strings over A; |x| is the length of the
string x. A (Chaitin) computer C is a partial recursive function carrying strings (on A) into strings such that
the domain of C is prefix-free, i.e. no admissible program can be a prefix of another admissible program. If
C is a computer, then TC denotes its time complexity, i.e. TC(x) is the running time of C on the entry x,
if x is in the domain of C; TC(x) is undefined in the opposite case. One can prove Chaitin’s Theorem (see,
for instance, Chaitin [12, 13], Calude [8], Svozil [49]) stating the existence of a universal computer U such
that for every computer C there exists a constant sim(U,C)—which depends upon U,C—such that in case
C(x) = y, there exists5 x′ such that
U(x′) = y, (1)
|x′| ≤ |x|+ sim(U,C). (2)
Assume, now, for the sake of a contradiction, that an “algorithmic prediction” is possible. Then the
universal computer can simulate the predictor, so it can itself act as a predictor. What does this mean? The
computer U can simulate every other computer (1), in a shorter time. Formally, to equation (1) we add
TU (x
′) < TC(x). (3)
Now, let us examine the possibility that U is a predictor. For every string x in the domain of U let
t(x) = min{TU (z) | z ∈ A∗, U(z) = U(x)}, (4)
i.e. t(x) is the minimal running time necessary for U to produce U(x).6
Next define the temporal canonical program (input) associated with x to be the first string (in quasi-
lexicographical order) x# satisfying the equation (4):
x# = min{z ∈ dom(U) | U(z) = U(x), TU (z) = t(x)}.
4Certain prediction tasks cannot be speeded up, though; see the discussion below.
5And can be effectively constructed.
6Actually, t(x) is not computable.
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So,
U(x#) = U(x), and TU (x
#) = t(x).
As the universal computer U is a predictor itself, and for itself, it follows from (3) that there exists a string
x′ such that U(x′) = U(x#) = U(x), and TU (x
′) < TU (x
#) = t(x), which is false. Therefore, every universal
predictor is “too slow” for certain tasks, in particular, predicting “highly time-efficient” (or, alternatively,
“highly time-consuming”) actions of itself.7
The reason for the above phenomenon can be illustrated by showing the existence of “ small-sized”
computers requiring “very large” running times. To this aim we use Chaitin’s version of the Busy Beaver
function Σ. Denote by H Chaitin complexity (or, algorithmic information content), that is the function
defined on (all) strings by the formula
H(x) = min{|y| | y ∈ A∗, U(y) = x},
i.e. H(x) is the length of the smallest program for the universal computer U to calculate x. For every
natural m let us denote by string(m) the mth string in quasi-lexicographical order, and let Σ(n) be the
largest natural number whose algorithmic information content is less than or equal to n, i.e.
Σ(n) = max{m | m ∈ IN,H(string(m)) ≤ n}.
Chaitin ([13], 80-82, 189) has shown that Σ grows larger than any recursive function, i.e. for every recursive
function f , there exists a natural number N , which depends upon f , such that Σ(n) ≥ f(n), for all n ≥ N :
indeed, any program of length n either halts in time less than Σ(n+O(1)), or else it never halts.
As H(string(Σ(n))) ≤ n, it follows that U(yn) = string(Σ(n)), for some string yn of length less than n.
This program yn takes, however, a huge amount of time to halt: there is a constant c such that for large
enough n, U(yn) takes between Σ(n− c) and Σ(n + c) units of time to halt. To conclude, the equation (1)
is compatible with (2) (Chaitin’s Theorem), but incompatible with (3).
Computation is a physical process, inevitably bound to physical degrees of freedom; all known physical
laws, in turn, are ultimately expressible by algorithms for information processing (i.e., they are computable).
The above discussion revealed some mathematical limits; they can be completed with pure physical limits,
as discovered by Mundici [38].8 Due to the fact that every computer is subject to the irreversibility and
uncertainty of time-energy, and maximality of the speed light, one can derive the following result: The total
time t and energy E spent for every computation consisting of n steps satisfy the inequality:
t ≥ n2 h
2piE
,
where h is Planck constant. For instance, it follows that computations involving more than 1030 steps are
infeasible.
This suggests that even inthe case the Universe is deterministic and unique, and its underlying laws are
algorithmic, an algorithmic prediction is impossible. It justifies also Go¨del’s claim according to which “no
person will ever learn his theory” in spite of the fact that such a theory might exist.
6 Uncomputability and Randomness: Two Examples
Various physical problems lead to the question whether a function, in a certain a class, has a real root. Results
due to Richardson [44], Caviness [11], Wang [57] (see also Matijasevicˇ [34]) show that for a large class of
well-defined functions such a problem is not algorithmically solvable. Da Costa and Doria [18] have proven
some undecidability results in physics using this tool. A different approach, based on Specker’s Theorem, was
developed by Pour-El and Richardson [43]. In this chapter we shall build on the work of Richardson, Wang,
and Chaitin to show that two problems in elementary physics are undecidable and display pure randomness.
7For an early investigation of a forecast inspired by recursion theory see Popper [42].
8Gandy [27, 28] has put forward related arguments imposing limitations to mathematical knowledge by the finiteness of
physical objects.
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6.1 Richardson-Wang and Chaitin Theorems
An exponential Diophantine equation is of the form
E1(x1, . . . , xm) = E2(x1, . . . , xm),
where E1, E2 are expressions constructed from variables and natural numbers, using addition, multiplica-
tion, and exponentiation. The equations which do not make use of exponentiation are called Diophantine
equations. Fermat’s famous equation
(p+ 1)s+3 + (q + 1)s+3 = (r + 1)s+3,
is an example of an exponential Diophantine equation. For every fixed s, the above equation is a Diophantine
equation, for instance, the equation
(p+ 1)3 + (q + 1)3 = (r + 1)3.
By a family of (exponential) Diophantine equations we understand an (exponential) Diophantine equation
E1(a1, . . . , an, x1, . . . , xm) = E2(a1, . . . , an, x1, . . . , xm), (5)
in which the set of all variables a1, . . . , an, x1, . . . , xm is divided into two classes, unknowns, x1, . . . , xm,
and parameters, a1, . . . , an. A set S ⊂ INn is called (exponential) Diophantine if there exists a family of
(exponential) Diophantine equations (5) such that
S = {(a1, . . . , an) ∈ INn|E1(a1, . . . , an, x1, . . . , xm) = E2(a1, . . . , an, x1, . . . , xm),
for some naturals x1, . . . , xm}.
Due to work of Davis, Matijasevicˇ, Putnam, Robinson (see Matijasevicˇ [34]) the following classes of sets
were shown to coincide: 1) the class of recursively enumerable sets, 2) the class of exponential Diophantine
sets, 3) the class of Diophantine sets.
By virtue of the existence of recursively enumerable sets which are not recursive (see, for instance, Calude
[7]) we deduce that the problem of testing whether an arbitrary (exponential) Diophantine equation has a
solution (in natural numbers) is recursively undecidable.9 A universal (exponential) Diophantine set, i.e. a
set which “codes” all (exponential) Diophantine sets is recursively enumerable, but not recursive.
In contrast with the case of (exponential) Diophantine equations—dealing with solutions in natural
numbers—the problem of deciding the solvability of polynomial equations with integer coefficients in real
unknowns is decidable. In the unary case this can be done by the well-known Sturm method; in the general
case one have to use Tarski’s method [53]. To get undecidability we have to allow the use of some other
functions; an easy way to achieve this is to consider the addition, multiplication, composition and the sine
function, all rationals and pi.
For our aim it is convenient to reformulate Richardson [44] and Wang [57] results as follows. We define,
for every natural n ≥ 1, ∆n to be the minimal (with respect to set-theoretical inclusion) family of expressions
which contains all rationalsand pi, the variables x1, . . . , xn, the functions sin(x) and e
x, and which is closed
under the operations of addition, multiplication, and composition.
The following predicates are recursively undecidable:
• For every G(x1) ∈ ∆1, “there exists a real number r such that G(r) = 0”.
• For every G(x1) ∈ ∆1, the predicate “the integral
∫ +∞
−∞
[(x2 + 1)G2(x)]−1dx is convergent”.
9This solved in the negative Hilbert’s Tenth Problem.
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Following Chaitin [12, 13] we do not ask whether an arbitrary Diophantine equation has a solution,
but rather whether it has an infinity of solutions. Of course, the new question is still undecidable. In
the former case the answers to such questions are not independent10, but in the later one the answers can
be independent in case the equation is constructed properly. Actually Chaitin has effectively constructed
such an exponential Diophantine equation (see his last Lisp construction in [14]) with the property that the
number of solutions jumps from finite to infinite at random as a certain fixed parameter is varied. Actually,
saying that the “number of solutions jumps from finite to infinite at random” is not a figure of speech, it
is just a remarkable technical statement: if the parameter n takes the values 1, 2, . . ., and ωn = 0 in case
the corresponding equation has finitely many solutions, and ωn = 1, in the opposite case, then the sequence
ω1ω2 · · ·ωi · · · is random in Martin-Lo¨f/Chaitin/Solovay sense; see Calude [8]. The real number number
Ω = 0.ω1ω2 · · ·ωi · · ·
represents the halting probability of a universal computer. In case we assume the hypothesis of strong
determinism, Ω has also a “physical” significance: it represents a constant of the Universe.11 The number
Ω is not invariant under changes of the underlying universal computer. However, all “constants” Ω share a
number of fascinating properties (see, for instance, Calude [8]); these changes might be similar to changes of
other “constants of Nature”, as Newton’s gravitational constant, the charge of an electron or the fine-structure
constant, under certain circumstances (changing the number of dimensions of the space, for instance).
6.2 One-dimensional Heat Equation
Improper integrals, for example, Fourier and Laplace transforms, play a particularly important role in
modelling physical phenomena (see, Courant, Hilbert [19], S¸tefa˘nescu [52]). Two examples involving the
Laplace transform illustrate uncomputability and randomness.
Let us first consider the heat conduction on an infinite slab. It is described by the one-dimensional heat
equation:


∂u
∂t
− ∂
2u
∂x2
= 0, x ∈ IR, t > 0,
u(x, 0) = f(x),
u(x, t) is bounded.
(6)
If
∂u
∂t
and
∂2u
∂x2
are supposed to be continuous and bounded, then the solution of (6) may be obtained
via the Laplace transform (see, Friedrichs [25]):12
u(x, t) =
1
2
√
pit
∫
∞
−∞
e−
(x−y)2
4t f(y)dy. (7)
6.3 A Problem of Electrostatics
Let us consider the plane electrostatic problem13 on IR×IR+ which satisfies the boundary potential condition
Φ(x, 0) = f(x).
10The reason is simple: we can determine which equations have a solution if we know how many of them are solvable.
11There is something attractive about permanence.
12Notice that the solution of the problem (6) may be also obtained by means of the Fourier transform. It is possible that for
some functions f the Laplace (or Fourier) transform does not exists, and still (7) verifies (6).
13A problem of electrostatics is plane if there is a distinguished direction such that all data are constant in this direction and
the field to be determined is also constant in this direction; Friedrichs [25].
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If Φ is an electrostatic potential, then the electric field E is given by
E = −grad Φ.
If D is a plane domain (i.e. an infinitely long cylinder with cross section D) bounded by a surface C
composed of several conductors14 at different potentials, then Φ is is a solution of the system15


∂2Φ
∂x2
+
∂2Φ
∂y2
= 0, (x, y) ∈ D,
Φ(x, 0) = f(x).
(8)
The problem (8) can be solved via the formalism of differential forms.16 The solution of (8) is given by
Φ(x, y) =
y
pi
∫
∞
−∞
f(t)
(t− x)2 + y2 dt. (9)
First we look at the solution of the one-dimensional heat equation (7). If f(y) = (y2 + 1)−1, then, for
every fixed (x0, t0), the solution
u(x0, t0) =
1
2
√
pit0
∫
∞
−∞
e
−
(x0−y)
2
4t0
y2 + 1
dy
is finite.
Consider now the function f(y) = ey
2
. Let t0 > 1 and x0 ∈ IR be fixed. Then
e
−
(x0−y)
2
4t0 f(y) > ey
2
−
(x0−y)
2
4 = e
3
4y
2
+
x0y
2 −
x2
0
4 .
For fixed x0, limy→∞
3
4
y2 + x0y
2
− x20
4
=∞, so the integral∫
∞
−∞
e
−
(x0−y)
2
4t0 f(y)dy
is divergent.
If f(y) = (y2 + 1)−1H−2(y) then, for every fixed (x0, t0), we get the solution
u(x0, t0) =
1
2
√
pit0
∫
∞
−∞
e
−
(x0−y)
2
4t0
(y2 + 1)H2(y)
dy =
1
2
√
pit0
∫
∞
−∞
1
(y2 + 1)K2(y)
dy.
In case H was in ∆1, then K is in ∆1 as well. So, the problem to test, for fixed (x0, t0), whether the solution
u(x0, t0) is finite or not for an arbitrary function H ∈ ∆1, is recursively undecidable.
Using Chaitin’s construction we can exhibit a sequence of functions Hi ∈ ∆1 such that the induced
sequence c1c2 · · · ci · · ·, ci = 0, if the corresponding solution is finite, ci = 1, in the opposite case, is random.
So, in the space of all solutions of (7) there are areas in which convergence and divergence alternate in a
pure random way.
Similar results can be obtained for the solution of the electrostatic plane problem. For fixed x0, y0, y0 6= 0,
the solution (9) can be represented as
Φ(x0, y0) =
1
piy20
∫
∞
−∞
f(y0u+ x0)
u2 + 1
du. (10)
If f(x) = G(x)−2, where G is a function in ∆1, then the the problem of testing whether Φ(x0, y0) is finite or
not is recursively undecidable. Again, we can effectively construct a sequence of solutions displaying pure
randomness, i.e. for which the sequence of answers to the convergence problem is random.
14The conductors are materials which do not exert any force on charged particles in their interior, but they do so at the
boundary. In a state of equilibrium the charges contained in a conductor are distributed over the boundary.
15The same system can be derived from conduction of electricity on a conducting sheet covering the domain D.
16The local existence of a potential Φ is described by the equality E = −dΦ; see Bamberg and Sternberg [1].
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7 Incompleteness
In a remarkable paper entitled Intelligent Machines17 ([54], 107-127) Turing investigates the possibility
as to whether machines, i.e. computers, might show intelligent behaviour. He considers the argument that
machines are inherently incapable of exhibiting human-like intelligent behaviour, because human mathemati-
cians are capable of determining the truth or falsity of mathematical statements in a way that machines,
as embodiments of formal systems that are subject to the limitations of Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem,
cannot. Turing notes that Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem
rests essentially on the condition that the machine must not make mistakes. But this is not a
requirement for intelligence.
He is suggesting that machines might perhaps equal human mathematicians if they were equipped with
a human-like capacity to make mistakes.
The analysis of predictability outlined in this paper is subject to Turing’s objection regarding mistakes.
Accordingly, we address the following question: Is Turing’s argument irrefutable?
At a first sight, requiring the absence of mistakes might seem to be overly restrictive. But how can a
mistake-making machine be constructed? Where should we place the border between “admissible” and “non-
admissible” mistakes in order to preserve the “intelligibility” of our Universe. How can a mistake-making
machine discover the regularities, common factors, recurrences, and implications, which tell us what things
are and how are they going to be in the future? According to Barrow ([2] p. 269):
the intelligibility of the world amounts to the fact that we find it to be algorithmically compress-
ible. We can replace sequences of facts and observational data by abbreviated statements which
contain the same information content. These abbreviations we often call “laws of Nature”.
However, we know that a total compression of the Universe is not actually possible as the existence of
chaotic processes points out (Chaitin [12, 13], Rucker [46], Svozil [49, 50, 51], Calude [8], Calude and Salomaa
[10]). How can we describe seemingly random processes in nature and reconcile them with supposed order?
How much can a given piece of information be compressed? Calude and Salomaa [10] have suggested that
the Universe is actually globally random, and, consequently, locally ordered. The Universe, like any network-
like structure can be seen both at local and global levels. Local properties require only a very nearsighted
observer—and for this level, science is indeed very useful and successful—but global properties are much
more difficult to “see”, they need a sweeping vision. For instance, the overall shape of a spiderweb is a global
property, while the average number of lines meeting a vertex is a local characteristic.
The relevance of Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem [32] argument has been questioned by different authors,
especially by Boolos, Chalmers, Davis and Perlis (see [41]; it contains also Penrose’s reply). In our opinion,
Turing’s critique—mentioned above—is the most substantial. It questions the status of Go¨del’s famous
unprovable statement: is this unprovable statement—seen to be “true” by Penrose—esoteric, accidental?
Does the incompleteness phenomenon have any relevance for a scientist’s daily life? This is a rather delicate
question. If we adopt a topological point of view (see Calude, Ju¨rgensen, Zimand [9]), then incompleteness
is a rather common, pervasive phenomenon: the set of true, but unprovable statements is topologically “very
large”, i.e. with respect to any reasonable topology the set of true and unprovable statements of a sufficiently
rich, sound, and recursively axiomatizable theory is dense and in many cases even co-rare. It is important
to notice that the above result holds true not only globally, but even for “fixed” problems. For instance,
the halting problem: there exists a large set of true, but unprovable, statements stating that some Turing
machine will never halt on a fixed entry.
The natural way to model “admissible mistakes” is to work with probabilistic Turing machines18 instead
of (ordinary) Turing machines. A probabilistic Turing machine has some distinguished states acting as
17This paper has attracted less interest than Computing Machinery and Intelligence ([54], 133-160); for instance, Penrose
does not quote it at all.
18This type of machine is sometimes called a Monte Carlo algorithm.
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“coin-tossing states” for which the finite control specifies p ≥ 2 possible next states. The computation is
deterministic except that in the distinguished states the machine uses the output of a random experiment to
decide among the p possible next states. So, a probabilistic Turing machine can make mistakes; the output is
not “truly correct”, but “correct within a probability”. Classical results due to De Leuuw, Moore, Shannon,
and Shapiro [17] and Gill [29] show that the class of functions computed by probabilistic algorithms coincides
with the class of recursive functions. The difference is only in complexity: if we do not insist on a guarantee,
then sometimes it is possible to compute faster. All results pertaining incompleteness, previously discussed,
remain valid, so it appears that Turing’s objection cannot be supported anymore: this probabilistic space
inherits the non-computability of the deterministic one.
8 Computability
Is the theory of computability (recursion theory)19 an appropriate framework to discuss physical laws and
thought processes? It is not unreasonable to suspect that the notion of computation will play a major role
in future research in the natural sciences; however, the global picture is more complex than it appears on a
first analysis.
Recursion theory is useful for proving the existence of uncomputable physical laws. If we are interested
in “useful” physical laws, i.e. laws which can be effectively used for practical purposes, then the theory of
computation might not be the appropriate tool. Indeed, it may happen that some function is computable,
but it is very difficult to compute,20 or even worse, that the computable function is impossible to compute
at all. For instance, consider the Continuum Hypothesis21 and the following function
f(n) =
{
1, if the Continuum Hypothesis is true,
0, if the Continuum Hypothesis is false,
suggested in Bridges [5]. According to classical logic, f is computable because there exists an algorithm that
computes it, i.e. the algorithm that returns either one or zero, for all non-negative integers. Deep work due
to Go¨del [33] and Cohen[16] shows that neither the Continuum Hypothesis nor its negation can be proven
within Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory augmented with the Axiom of Choice, the standard framework of classical
mathematics, so we will never know which of the two algorithms—“print one”, or “print zero”—is the right
one. We conclude that the standard theory of computable functions does not match computational practice!
The paradoxical nature of this example comes from the underlying logic of computability. To handle this
problem we have to distinguish between existence in principle and existence in practice. A possible approach
is to consider provable computable functions introduced by Fischer [22]. A computable function is called
provable with respect to some formal system S which contains second order arithmetic if there exists an
algorithm which computes it and which can be proven to be total in S. These functions are interesting
because they are functions we usually work with in practice, e.g. in numerical analysis. What do we lose
sacrificing all computable functions in favour of provable computable ones? Gordon [31] has proven that
this class of functions is a complexity class, i.e. it can be computed with limited resources, say in time.
Now, if we apply some results in Calude [7] we arrive at the conclusion that there is an essential difference
between computable functions and provable computable functions: in a constructive sense, the former class
is of second Baire category (i.e. large) while the later one is meagre (i.e. small). Informally this means that
most computable functions are not provable computable; the difference between functions “computable in
principle” and provable computable functions is significant.22
19A truly remarkable achievement of modern mathematics is the discovery of recursive (or, computable) functions, i.e.
functions which can be computed by algorithms. Within the realm of this theory it is possible to prove the existence of
functions that are not computable by any algorithm whatsoever. The theory of computability has not yet become part of
mainstream physics, but it can serve perfectly well as a guiding principle to hitherto informal notions such as “determinism”.
20Actually, for every computational measure, for instance, time or space, there exist arbitrarily difficult to compute functions;
see Calude [7].
21There is no cardinal number strictly in between aleph-null, the cardinal of the the set of natural numbers, and aleph-one,
the cardinal of the set of reals.
22In this context it is interesting to note a result—obtained in 1964—which can be considered as “Chaitin (very first)
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9 Conclusions
The paradox mentioned by Penrose is not real, because “real predictors” do not exist.23 This is because
every (universal) predictor is “too slow” for certain tasks, in particular for predicting actions of itself. Two
more examples of uncomputability of physical laws are discussed. Turing’s objection concerning Go¨del’s
Incompleteness Theorem is confronted with the fact that, from a topological point of view, the incompleteness
phenomenon is common and pervasive; this result is still true for probabilistic Turing machines, i.e. for
machines allowed to make “reasonable” mistakes. Although we have refuted Penrose’s argument that strong
determinism and computability are logically incompatible, we have found independent reasons to support his
conclusion concerning the non-computability of physical laws. Finally we are lead to the following question:
is the theory of computation an appropriate framework to discuss physical laws and thought processes? We
argue that for proving non-computability results the answer is affirmative; for more practical purposes, in
which we are interested not only in discovering physical laws, but in using them to make predictions, the
answer might be negative. Other aspects of the problem, e.g., the role of the observer and “approximation”
in making predictions, will be treated in another paper.
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